Sunday, March 20, 2011

Security – An Everlasting Wait for a Ray of Hope that Has Yet to Shine

                                                                             Was published in a weekly paper in Dec 09
(Part-I)
The main reasons why no government ever gained legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans and even the international community after Sardar Daud Khan’s government overturn and prior to the Bonn Agreement were that the governments were forced on people, they failed to establish the basic level of security (not even desirable), weren’t by/of/for governments or they were run by those who did not hesitate in violating human rights, which is no secret to anyone.
After the Bonn Agreement was signed and an interim government was established in 2001, Afghanistan had a lifetime opportunity to establish and strengthen the weakened to nonexistent security infrastructure of Afghanistan, which President Karzai wasted in dealing with the figures who were not so favored by the international community or were headaches. Moreover, the key international ally, the United States of America, turned its face to Iraq, a deep dark well.
Today, even with an internationally-recognized and a so-called nationally-united government that claims to be by, of and for people and the one that deliberately overlooks the heinous past of the human rights violators in the pretext of national reconciliation and after irresponsible use of billions of dollars and the begging of the president to the Taliban for reconciliation, something that the Afghan government along with its international allies have not even come closer to securing is security itself. The million dollar question is why the hundreds of thousands international and national troops with unprecedented resources can’t secure a country which is more or less the size of California? That is a question that the international community needs to ask itself while we will have a glance at security and what it means to Afghans and why they think security has deteriorated in the recent years.
“Security means not having major economic, social and political problems” said one of the interviewees in a research conducted by Human Rights Research & Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC) and two of the basic reasons for the deteriorating security were identified “poverty” and “unemployment in the same report, which leads us to believe that an average Afghan has broadened his/her horizons and can see farther than Taliban, Al-Qaeda, suicide attacks, drugs and son and so forth as far as security is concerned. According to people, the worsening of the security situation is as result of the following failures:
  1. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Failure: DDR and DIAG have been more of a publicity stunt for the Afghan government and the international community and an easy money opportunity for the DDR’ed and DIAG’ed militias than what they should really have been. Despite the DDR and DIAG efforts, which have been going on for over 5 years, neither have all the guns been collected nor has the number of guns been reduced. According to an international research conducted in Afghanistan, at least, 2000 unruly and disruptive armed groups wander across the country, 100 of which are on their toes to get in action at any given time. They are responsible for kidnappings, homicide, mugging, armed robbery etc. They have spread an atmosphere of fear and terror in parts of the country, which affects an average Afghan and curtails development efforts in the victimized parts. DDR has failed in its “reintegration” stages the most as neither the government nor the English-&-computer-dominated private sector was ready to fully integrate these militias. The institutions that were established to employ these militias or teach them vocations were mostly short-term efforts just like the money and the other aid offered to the DDR’ed militias. When a government offers a lot of money and aid without a long-term solution (creating long-term jobs etc) to a massive effort like DDR that affects the whole nation and with penalty measures equal to zero to establish the rule of law, the outcome of such plans is not only counterproductive but also backfires as it has. Did anyone think about what would happen when the money and the temporary jobs dry up for these militias? And what would happen if after learning a vocational trade, the militias did not know how to manage a business?

  1. Arming New Militias:
As if the failures of DDR and DIAG weren’t enough of a lesson, the international forces decided to arm tribal leaders and local people to so-called protect themselves from and fight against the Taliban and insurgents, who are still vaguely defined by both the Afghan government and its international allies, for a few dollars. This measure was taken after more than two decades of its failure during Dr. Najibullah’s presidency. Dr. Najibullah was disappointed by the by-then militias as not only did they not fight against the Mujahideen but also used the by-then modern weaponry of the government against them. Afghans follow culture for most of their lives, especially when it comes to waging war. Afghans have the tendency to support their own people no matter how wrong they are than to support the foreigners no matter how right they are. Don’t doubt the judgment of Afghans. It is just that Afghans come from a culture and religion-oriented society wherein values, practices, needs, demands and goals are interwoven and intersect at some point. Moreover, the experiences of the British and Soviet occupations are still afresh in the minds of the Afghans. It is needless to say that the present international forces have given Afghans enough reasons to turn their backs against them and even join the Taliban. On another note, what is the guarantee that these non-uniformed, free-spirited men want to take up guns to only protect themselves and not settle old scores/family feuds with their enemies who live in their localities? What is the guarantee that these men will not join the Taliban/insurgents when the NATO/ISAF trained and uniformed Afghan police have joined the Taliban/insurgents already in different parts of the country? What is the guarantee that they will only use their arms against the Taliban/insurgents and not terrify or intimidate the locals for their own interests? “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” Are we fooling ourselves unintentionally or deliberately? The real solution could be increasing the number of the police, building their capacities and providing them with enough resources to handle the rule-of-law and make a living without having to be corrupt.
In conclusion, the failure of DDR and DIAG greatly undermine the development efforts in Afghanistan. If after millions of dollars has been spent to take away the guns, but we still see guns and thousands of armed groups wandering around the country, it is certainly appalling. The government and the international community have to take DIAG more seriously and focus more on it from the rule-of-law standpoint than that of a militia ATM. Push has come to shove and serious and practical measures have to be taken. Or else, irreversible and unimaginable deeds will be in store for Afghanistan. Last but not the least, arming militias was a failed attempt decades ago and although it may seem functioning and bringing about short-term results, in the long run, it will be a bigger failure than it was decades ago
(Part-II)
Last week, we talked about the failures of the DDR/DIAG and arming new militias. This week, we will talk about the other key elements that have caused security concerns.
a. The International Forces – Foreignfully Yours:
Most of the foreign forces enter Afghanistan like aliens come to the planet Earth. They are completely oblivious to the culture and religious sensitivities, haven’t been oriented about the country they are deployed in, at all, or have come to kill the enemy whom they don’t even fully know. However, little can you expect from them when their president says that Afghan-Americans, who know Urdo well, should be employed and sent to Afghanistan to help his country’s troops in smooth running of their daily operations while interacting with the locals. In Afghanistan, only Dari, Pashto and Uzbeki are the official languages. Urdo is spoken in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.
About a year ago, I remember watching a documentary film on Iraq. In one of its segments, a US marine, who was part of the invading troop in Iraq, narrated his findings at the Iraq border. The marine said that he asked his commander what the “code of conduct” was. In other words, he wanted to know who to shoot at and who not to shoot at. His commander told him to shoot at anyone who seemed like enemy to him. He confessed that as he hadn’t been out of his home state in the United States, everyone in Iraq seemed to be enemy and was to be shot at.
Now, supposedly, if a soldier is deployed in Afghanistan without orientation and someone describes the physical features of a Talib/insurgent to him in the same vein as did the US commander in Iraq, what would they be? A man who wears a turban (mostly black), has beard and mustache, wears long dress with pantaloons of the same color and supposedly looks mad. With such physical features in mind, how many people are Taliban in Afghanistan? The number is extremely high. If we suppose that the soldier is kind-hearted and doesn’t shoot at all such figures, can we infer that the percentage of the innocent Afghans who are jailed in the foreign forces' bases is high because they are “guilty” according to such description? The documentary film “Taxi to the Dark Side” released in 2007 is a sad account of one of such case we are talking about.
According to HRRAC “Afghan Perception of Insecurity” report, a schoolgirl in Kabul had commented that the international forces prioritized their own security over Afghans’ security and did not hesitate in jeopardizing Afghans lives for that. She had added that with such attitude of the international forces, Afghanistan would never be secured. We have seen how the international forces drive around the cities. It is nothing short of a wild roller-coaster ride. One such incident caused a big riot in the Kabul city a few years back. Minimizing their movement in the city will do a world of good both to them and the Afghans.
The frisking and searching of Afghan women by men is an unforgivable act. How many of the foreign forces know that? How many of them have made this mistake and how many of them are completely oblivious to it?
Night raids are not only wrong but are also uncultured. As much as Afghans are hospitable, they don’t like intruders, especially with sniffing dogs who scare the daylight out of their mothers, sisters, wives and children, to come to their homes at night, turn their homes upside down and arrest and take away anyone they find suspicious or they please. Only one such incident is enough for an Afghan to decide that he should kill all the violators and to do so, he has to join the Taliban. It is needless to say that the doors/gates they have are to be knocked, not to be broken. It is the sign of uttermost disrespect apart from being an economic loss. Remember, “in Afghanistan hearts and minds are to be won” and no hearts and minds can be won by breaking doors and offering nothing but humiliation and inconsideration.
In the foreign forces countries of origin, the aforementioned acts are serious violations (armed intrusion/trespassing) and such violators are even shot by the landowners or the police. How can they consider one very act violation in their countries, but make it a routine in Afghanistan? Do Afghan citizens not deserve the human rights enjoyed by any human being around the world? Do they not practice what they preach? Have the foreign forces come to Afghanistan to fight Al-Qaeda and the Taliban or have they come to try and see what it is like to be wild and brutal? Do the foreign forces really know that Afghanistan is not the second Vegas?
Aerial strikes are condemned universally. They have, thankfully, been reduced considerably. However, it is high time to make that as a non-option.
b. Economy:
One of the main causes of insecurity in Afghanistan has been its bad economy. “Poverty” and “unemployment” have been identified as the two major economic causes of insecurity. One reason why Afghans join the Taliban is that they are greatly disappointed and angered by the foreign forces acts as mentioned above. Another probable cause, which could be the root cause of the people joining the Taliban/insurgents or the armed groups, is that they haven’t seen enough employment and income opportunities. Currently, the majority of Afghans live under the poverty line. Poverty and unemployment give birth to crime and, in Afghanistan, to the Talibanization and serious crimes. When the Taliban/insurgents/armed groups offer easy money for their activities, they may find a lot of Afghans who will offer their services to them.
c. Drugs:
Poppy cultivation and the whole nine yards of the drug industry have defamed Afghans internationally although growing poppy and drugs is forbidden in Islam and is not favored in the Afghan culture. Drugs should be annihilated in Afghanistan. The big fish of this notorious industry should be identified and sent behind bars. Air spraying or getting rid of the poppy fields of small-time farmers will not do much. Asking farmers to grow wheat instead of poppy is no different than asking someone to replace their golden ring with a stone. Giving away only money to the farmers is no different than giving away money to the DDR’ed/DIAG’ed militias. It will only produce short-term results and the farmers will go back to growing poppy once the money is finished. The international forces along with the (border) police have to make sure that the export of poppy is made impossible both by land and by air. Once the drug-traffickers are sent behind bars and the export routes are blocked for the farmers, they will be left with no option but to grow a produce that has market and saleability.
(Part-III)
Last week, we discussed the Afghans’ concerns vis-à-vis the foreign forces operations in Afghanistan and how drugs and the economy are responsible for security deterioration in Afghanistan. This week, we will talk about the Afghan police force or the ANP (Afghan National Police) and the security of the children.
A. Afghan National Police (ANP)
In a perfect world, when we hear the word “security”, the word “police” crosses our minds instantly, but if we think about security in Afghanistan, we start counting: ISAF, NATO, ANA, ANP, NSD, local militias/auxiliary militias and many more simply because there are too many variables that play their roles in the Afghan security.
The police are the most vulnerable force in Afghanistan. They are in the frontlines of the attacks and the softest targets for the Taliban/insurgents as they are deployed in almost all corners of the cities and on highways. Mostly, they are not equipped with bulletproof vests, warm clothing, proper and secure barricades, food and weaponry. With all that in mind, if an Afghan agrees to join the police force with the sole motive of securing Afghanistan, he/she is the bravest Afghan and the one to be respected and loved by all.
“The Afghan police give the most sacrifices, yet their reputation is questioned all the time.” Said the Minister of Interior Atmar in one of his interviews in the United States, which proves that the Afghan police force is of variable quality: the ones that sacrifice their lives (the heroes) and the ones that compromise the reputation of the police by taking bribe, behaving unjustly etc (the traitors).
The followings are the reasons why after so many years of reestablishment and sacrifices, still, the Afghans are not satisfied with the police efforts:
  1. Lack of Proper Schooling:
Most of the new and young recruits are the products of the crash courses provided by the Ministry of Interior. Today securing the “officer” rank has become so easy that even a high school graduate can secure it. There was a time when not everyone could join the police force. However, today, not everyone wants to join the police. The foundation of strong police institutions was dismantled during the different wars in Afghanistan and has yet to be established due to unparalleled security deterioration over the last 4 years. Worse than that is the existence of illiterate police recruits. With the low level of schooling or with no schooling, how can a police officer know what the rights of the citizens are and what his limitations are? Much less we talk about “complex issues”, such as human rights, felony, misdemeanor, fraction etc. Educated people will only join the police force if the police salaries are raised considerably, which do not seem likely considering the current budget of the ANP and/or make joining the police compulsory.
  1. Corruption:
Corruption has undermined the whole reconstruction effort in Afghanistan and has cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of the Afghan government. When a country’s police, in particular, get corrupted, the pillars of almost all other foundations waggle. Corruption in the police may result in the thieves, muggers, robbers, assassins, kidnappers, extortionists, rapists, looters, Taliban/insurgents, government corrupt officials and lawbreakers get away with their crimes. Moreover, the strong religious and culture values for which Afghanistan stands will be done away with the shower of money.
Another major underlying cause of corruption in police is their low salaries. The insufficiency of their salaries and the existence of a huge scope for corruption tempt almost every police officer to get corrupted. In the in-depth interviews carried by HRRAC researchers for the “Afghan Perception of Insecurity”, some of the low-ranking police officers revealed that corruption was institutionalized and that even honest police officers were often compelled to act according to their corrupt supervisors’ orders.
If rumors are to be believed, it is said that at one point, the police chief (district-level) positions were auctioned for a $100,000. If it is not a rumor, it means that the district police chiefs paid $100,000 each, which they could not make in their lifetime service with legit money. So, why did they invest so much money when the salability of their jobs gave them no job security? After investing $100,000, they surely wanted to make another $100,000 or even more as profit. Figuring out the rest does not require a rocket scientist and expecting just behavior, honesty and professionalism from them is utter naivety.
Although it may sound a bit odd, having the police officers go through a lie-detecting test at the time of their recruitment to determine whether they want to join the police force for under the table deals or to provide real services and making it an off-and-on and on need-basis discipline will do a world of good both to the ministry and the average public. The lie-detecting test will prevent almost all the corruption in the police. Yes! Lie detecting tests could be passed even if one lies, but since the technology is fairly recent and almost nonexistent to Afghans, it will take them a long time to figure it out. Moreover, there is strong possibility that the Ministry of Interior will be free of corrupt officers by then.
  1. Ties & Connections:
Generally speaking, Afghans have extensive familial, provincial, ethnic and religious ties, which make Afghanistan even smaller than it already is. This culture-oriented nature of Afghans is praiseworthy. However, when it comes to the police, these ties and connections have a negative impact. For example, a police officer finds it very difficult to act neutral and be just to an Afghan who has a problem with another Afghan who happens to be (even) his third or fourth cousin. The police officer has to act in favor of his third/fourth cousin as he is answerable to his relatives and does not want to bear enmity with them.
The connections circle is vast. If a police officer, regardless of his rank, has connections with an influential warlord or a powerful figure, how fair is he going to act in a murder case where the culprit is the son of the aforementioned warlord or powerful figure? Worse case scenario: how is a provincial chief of police going to handle the rule of law if he is appointed by the recommendation of a local warlord?
HRRAC’s “Afghan Perception of Security” suggests that the “confidence in law enforcement bodies remain low and the people’s distrust of police integrity and abilities considerably increases when issues such as ethnicity and socioeconomic class are considered”.
Cutting the Afghan ties and connections is next to impossible. However, filling the key police positions of one province with officers from other provinces and rotating them on a regular yet long-term basis will probably make it less complicated for the police to be just. Again, the lie-detectors can help with this problem, too.
The aforementioned HRRAC report summarized corruption and the unjustness of the police in the following calculation:
Unjust behavior of the police = high/low level corruption + ethnic bias + loyalty to ex-commanders
B. The Security of Children:
The most valued assets of an Afghan are his/her children. However, kidnapping for extortion and the dying of children in the suicide attacks are of great concerns to the parents. According to HRRAC’s “Afghans Perception of Insecurity” report, parents aren’t at ease with their children walking to school. They are afraid something is going to happen to them as Afghans have experienced it.
According to HRRAC’s “Afghan Perception of Insecurity” report, in the South, there have been reports of the police refusing to protect girls on their way to school from the Taliban.
Most of the (affluent) Afghans opt for private schools simply because they provide transportation. The kidnapping of the kids for ransom is a terrifying issue for the Afghan businessmen and affluent people that the Afghan government hasn’t been able to tackle with completely. Most Afghans use this insecurity as a yardstick to measure security in the country. The insecurity of kids means an insecure next generation, which Afghanistan cannot afford. There has to be stronger measures taken against the kidnappers and the punishment should be more severe so that people should not even think of kidnapping one’s beloved one(s) for money.
This three-part article was a HRRAC effort to address the major security issues and the suggestions of the average public for betterment. We hope that the concerned security institutions, at both national and international levels, give an ear to them, at the least.
====================================================================

posted by Z @ 4:06 AM   0 Comments